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Critical Remarks on Roman Law 
in the Prussian Correction1
Ius terrestre nobilitatis Prussiae correctum, commonly known as the 
Prussian Correction, is—as we know—a partial codification of 
the Prussian land law, enacted by the Sejm (diet) and endorsed by the 
king in 1598.2 It was brought about after very protracted and extraor-
dinarily inept preparatory work, if one can even apply that phrase to 
the repeatedly adjourned or forgone conferences and gatherings during 
which the reform was to be developed. The reform itself stemmed from 
the demands of the Prussian nobility who, under the charter issued by 
Kazimierz Jagiellończyk in 1476, had been governed by the law of 
Kulm. This was municipal law, and the nobles deplored its uncertainty 
and lack of precision, though most of all they were unwilling to accept 
1 Translated from: Z. Lisowski, O prawie rzymskim w korekturze pruskiej. Uwagi krytyczne, 
“Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne” 1954, t. 6, pp. 194–220 by Szymon Nowak and proof-
read by Stephen Dersley. The translation and proofreading were financed by the Ministry 
of Science and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018. This paper, being a fragment 
from a more comprehensive work by this author, was to have been published in the previous 
volume, dedicated to the 500th anniversary of incorporation of Prussia into Poland. The edi-
tors include the article in this volume, all the more readily since as a model of critique and 
analysis of a source text it may contribute substantially to a more profound and vigorous study 
of the important issue of the reception of Roman law in Poland during the age of the Nobles’ 
Democracy.
2 Promulgated in print several times, also in Polish and German translation.. the Correction 
was included in vol. VI of the Piarist edition of Volumina Legum, and from thence reprinted 
in Ohryzko’s edition, vol. VI, pp. 270–281. I have used this latter edition V. S. Kutrze-
ba, Historia źródeł dawnego prawa polskiego, vol. II, Lwów–Warszawa–Kraków 1926, 
p. 39 ff.
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the community of property it imposed and the resulting regime of suc-
cession ab intestato.3
In the scholarly literature, the authorship of the Correction is at-
tributed to two royal secretaries, Reinhold Heidenstein and Mikołaj 
Niewieściński. In reality, however, according to the testimony of Leng-
nich—who may be relied on, given his thorough knowledge of the his-
tory of Royal Prussia—things were different. At the Prussian diet in 
Grudziądz held on January 22 1598, both presented their drafts fol-
lowing the request of the Prussian estates (Heidenstein personally and 
Niewieściński in writing). Their projects became the object of day-
long discussion4, but at the Sejm which began on March 2, 1598, only 
Heidenstein’s draft was deliberated on and subjected to vote,5 subse-
quently receiving royal approval.6 Thus the current text of the Correc-
tion originates solely with Heidenstein. 
Heidenstein had some grounding as far as codification was con-
cerned. After a short stay in Königsberg and Wittenberg, he registered 
in October 1575 with the Alemanian nation of jurists in Padua where he 
spent over four years (until November 1579).7 He therefore had enough 
time and sufficient opportunity to gain considerable knowledge of Ro-
man law. Although a substantial lapse of time—19 years—divides his 
studies and the drafting of the Correction, the text of the statute clearly 
shows that at the time of writing the author was still fairly conversant 
with Roman law. Without such knowledge, his draft of the statute would 
not have defined the capacity of a minor to act by means of a formula 
modelled on I. 1, 21: omnibus autem in rebus wardlus meliorem suam 
3 A detailed account of the preparatory efforts may be found in vols. III and IV of G. Leng-
nich, Geschichte der preussischen Lande königlichen Anteils, Gdańsk 1727.
4 G. Lengnich, op.cit., vol. IV, pp. 255–256.
5 In the course of deliberations of the Prussian deputies, Niewieściński went as far as making 
certain allegations against Heidenstein’s draft. V. G. Lengnich, op.cit., vol. IV, p. 262.
6 G. Lengnich, op.cit. Based on Lengnich, a correct account of the affair is presented in 
E. Nehring, O życiu i pismach R. Heidensteina, Poznań 1862, p. 12 ff.
7 On Heidenstein’s studies in Padua see Barycz in Pamiętnik Literacki, XXVI, 1929, 
pp. 213—223.
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conditionem etiam sine tutorum authoritate facere poterit, deteriorem 
non (Title III, 18) nor conveyed the principle which sanctioned the re-
vocation and modification of the testament using the sentence: ut ad 
mortem cuiusque voluntas ambulatoria et libera sit, which paraphrases 
Ulpian’s statement in D. 24.1, 32.3 and 34.4; he would not have justi-
fied the institution of usucaption with ne rerum dominia in incerto sint 
(Title IV.1), taken verbatim from I. 2.6pr, which in its turn derived from 
somewhat differently formulated text in Gaius I.44; finally, he would not 
have determined culpae latae as dolo proxima had he not had guidance 
in that respect in three sections from Ulpian, which incidentally had all 
been interpolated in any case (D. 11.1, 11.11; 43.26, 8.3; 47.4, 1, 2). 
That general, Roman-like wording in the Correction might have given 
the impression and engendered the conviction that the statute as a whole 
was under considerable Roman influence, which may be termed as re-
ception. This conviction was formulated in an unpublished work by 
one of the students of Prof. Taubenschlag, Sygierycz, whose findings 
Prof. Taubenschlag included in his valuable volume on the reception of 
Roman law in Poland,8 which otherwise relied on the latter’s own compre-
hensive research. Mentioning the name of the author, Prof. Taubenschlag 
indirectly intimated that he did not intend to bear full personal responsi-
bility for the findings that his student had arrived at. I am therefore even 
more encouraged to make some critical remarks regarding Sygierycz’s as-
sertions where they concern private law in the Correction, though they are 
not materially addressed to the scholar whose body of works comprises 
a fair number of publications on Polish court law in the Middle Ages. 
I
First and foremost, two misunderstandings have to be clarified. The au-
thor whose findings were communicated courtesy of Prof. Taubenschlag 
8 R. Taubenschlag, La Storia della recezione del diritto romano in Polonia fino alla fine del 
secolo XVI, in: L’Europa e il diritto romano, vol. I, Milan 1953, pp. 227—242.
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identified, for example, influences of Roman law in the Correction’s 
provisions concerning the testamentary inventory and the admissibility 
of action for inheritance (hereditatis petitio), not only against the pos-
sessor but also against one qui dolo desiit possidere. Sadly, both these 
assertions are completely erroneous. 
As we know, beneficium inventarii had been introduced into the 
Roman legal system by Justinian, by virtue of the constitution of 531 
contained in C. 6.30,22 and summarized in I. 2.19,6. Justinian’s cre-
ation triumphed over the centuries, surviving until today.9 It is therefore 
possible that it found its way into the Prussian Correction, just as it was 
included in the 1580 edition of the Kulm law in which, despite having 
been formulated in general terms, it concurred in its premises and effect 
with Justinian’s law.10 However, there is no trace of it in the Correction. 
Indeed, the final section of Title I is provided with the heading de inven-
tario, and it is concerned with the inventory in the context of succession, 
but this is not the inventory of Justinian. As is known, and as follows 
from the designation itself, beneficium inventarii is a privilege or an 
entitlement of an heir who, having accepted the inheritance without re-
course to the so-called tempus deliberandi and having compiled a list of 
all assets and liabilities in a manner and time prescribed by law (90 days 
in total), would be liable to the creditors only to the amount of inheri-
tance stated in the inventory, and have to satisfy such creditors as they 
come forward until all assets are exhausted. In contrast, the inventory in 
the Prussian Correction is not a privilege but an obligation. The obliga-
9 E.g. in chronological order: Napoleonic code: Art. 793–813, Austrian code: §§ 800–807, 
German code: §§ 1993–2012, Swiss code §§ 380—B92, Italian code: Art. 484–611; Polish 
inheritance law: Art. 34, 49 § 2. In Soviet law, the estate regulated in § 100 of the Instruction 
of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of March 2nd, 
1948, has a different foundation and purpose, given that Art. 434 of the code sets forth—
rightly so in my opinion—that the heir is liable only to the amount of the assets inherited.
10 Cap. 147: Haeres .. . sin autem, uti par est. inventarium cum scitu et consensu iudicis 
conscripserit, explorandi causa, quantae sint haereditatis illius facultates, et quantum ex 
ea creditoribus debeatur, hoc casu nulla cogitur necessitate, qua cui tum ultra vires haere-
ditatis exsolvat. P.J.W. Bandtkie, Ius Culmense cum appendice privilegiorum et jurium se-
lectorum municipalium et dissertatione historicojuridica exhibitum, cura, Warszawa 1814.
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tion rests with the one quicumque haereditatem vel etiam usumfructum 
possederit, in other words on the possessor of the testamentary estate.11 
Within four months from succession (post mortem defuncti intra men-
sem quatuor), such a holder should make an inventory (inventarium fa-
cere tenebitur), for which act they should request the presence of both 
suitable witnesses as well as heirs, or at least one of them (testibus fide 
dignis suae conditionis adhibitis, haeredibusque aut aliquo ex illis vo-
catis). Should they fail to discharge the obligation, or the inventory they 
have made is deemed unreliable (quod nisi fecerit aut fides inventario 
habita non fuerit), they shall be summoned to appear before land court 
within a peremptory time-limit12, where they would confirm under oath 
that they have made the inventory with due honesty and without seeking 
to conceal anything (peremptorium terminum habebit atque ad primam 
citationem respondere tenebitur, corporaleque iuramentum praestabit 
omnia bona fide in inventarium a se relata nihilque ex bonis defuncti 
a se celatum vel celari). Thus the differences with respect to the inven-
tory in the constitution C. 6, 30, 22 are striking: 1. there, the successor 
is entitled in a particular manner, here, the holder of the testamentary 
property is under an obligation; 2. the Justinian inventory encompasses 
all the active and passive components of the estate, while the inven-
tory in the Correction specifies only the property held by the person 
obligated to compile the inventory; 3. the time set forth for making the 
inventory is different, with 90 days in the Justinian Code and 4 months 
in the Correction; 4. finally, the goals of the inventory differ—there the 
aim is to protect the heir in case of excessive debt on the estate, while 
here the objective is to facilitate the determination of its components 
for the heir. In all fairness, one remark is due regarding the last sen-
tence. The Prussian Correction is not an exhaustive codification. Even 
in those domains which it regulates, numerous matters are left without 
11 Naturally, I understand that possession most generally, not in the sense of the Roman pos-
session ad interdicta, which in principle the user did not have.
12 On the meaning of termin zawity (peremptory time-limit) v. O.M. Balzer, Przewód sądowy 
polski, Lwów 1935, p. 96.
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pertinent statutory provisions. In the land law of Royal Prussia, the said 
affairs were no doubt governed by the law of Kulm, in accordance with 
the charter of 1476. It is therefore likely that the obligation to make an 
inventory of testamentary property which is imposed on its holder was 
linked to the heir’s exercise of the right which they had been granted 
under cap. 147 of the aforesaid digest of the Kulm law, and was in-
tended to ease the task of surveying the assets. However, detailed provi-
sions of the 531 constitution do not mention any obligation compelling 
anyone to aid the inheritor in the task of making the inventory, while it 
remains unknown whether such obligation had existed in Roman law. 
It is therefore difficult—even in such a hypothetical, indirect fashion—
to presume the influence of Roman law. At any rate, the discussed regu-
lation in the Correction does not in itself reproduce the provisions of the 
constitution C. 6, 30, 22 and cannot therefore attest to the reception of 
Roman law into that statute. 
Much the same is the case with the Roman legal principle of passive 
locus standi of the possessor or one qui dolo desiit possidere upon heredi-
tatis petitio, which had allegedly been received into the Correction. This 
assertion was advanced most likely in connection with Section 6, Title II 
of the Correction: de donationibus et testamentis. However, when the 
provision is examined more closely, it is easy to demonstrate that it is 
not at all concerned with the petition of a claimant to the succession 
against the holder of the estate or with the dispute regarding succession. 
Its factual state is rather similar to what one finds in Gaius II, 167 i.f.13 
Namely, it is founded on the fact that the heir appointed to the succes-
sion renounces it (si haereditati, in quam debebat succedere, quis renun-
ciaverit, sive filius sive quicunque alius). In consequence: 1. not having 
acquired the status of successor they will not be liable for the liabilities 
of the estate (ad debita quidem solvenda, aut alia onera haereditatis non 
tenebitur); and 2. the estate should be handed over to the creditors so 
13 Solet praetor postulantibus hereditariis creditoribus tempus constituere, intra quod si velit 
(sc. heres) adeat hereditatem, si minus, ut liceat creditoribus bona defuncti vendere.
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that their claims may be satisfied (bona autem omnia creditoribus dimi-
tiere debet). However, there may arise the suspicion that the inheritor 
withholds a portion of the estate. In such a case: a creditore ad ludicium 
Terrestre vocatus, terminum peremptorium habebit, in quo corporale 
iuramentum praestet, nihil ex bonis dejuncti se possidere, aut dolo malo 
possidere desiisse, quod si praestare recusaverit ac liquidum debitum, 
quod petetur, fuerit, ad solvendum cogatur. Thus it is not the successor 
who becomes the claimant in the dispute, but the creditor of the estate; 
the would-be successor, as opposed to the holder of the estate, is the re-
spondent; the object of the action is to determine whether the respondent 
withheld any part of the estate rather than recover the estate and, should 
the respondent fail to swear that they do not possess any portion of the 
estate, to award it to the claimant in respect of liquid debt, obviously not 
exceeding the amounts possessed or the malevolently disposed compo-
nents of the estate (to use the terminology of the Code of Obligations).14 
The reference to Roman law can only be seen in the application—with 
a different state of fact at hand—of the principle of liability for property 
possessed and malevolently disposed, which had in fact existed in Ro-
man law in connection with inheritance claims (cf. D. 5, 30, 20, 6c and 
27 pr.).15 However, the Correction is in no way concerned with a claim 
against the estate and passive locus standi.
II
Another untenable proposition is that the Correction’s system of suc-
cession ab intestato derives directly from Justinian’s Novels 118 from 
543, supplemented in one point by Nov. 127 from 548. The former piece 
of legislation is known to have introduced order into the tangle of Ro-
14 The content of the respective provisions in the Correction was accurately reconstructed by 
P. Dąbkowski, Prawo prywatne polskie, vol. II, p. 39.
15 I ask that Roman law scholars forgive me for not discussing the difference between the time 
before the contestation of suit and after, and—prior to litis contestatio—between the pos-
sessor in good and bad faith. The matter is irrelevant to our deliberations.
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man intestate succession, since the Senate’s resolutions and imperial 
constitutions (beginning with Sc. Tertullianum under Hadrian) disrupted 
the precisely delineated boundary between agnatic ab intestato inheri-
tance based on the Law of the Twelve Tables and the praetorian bono-
rum possession which allowed for cognation by granting civil rights of 
succession to some cognatic relations before civil law successors or on 
a par with the latter. 
Justinian’s reform is founded on two principles. First, it utterly 
abolished any distinction between agnation and cognation and based 
statutory inheritance law solely on natural, cognatic kinship. The prin-
ciple is conveyed already in the preface to the Novels16 (omnes simul 
cognationis ab intestato successiones per presentem legern clava et 
compendiaria distinctione definire), and stated even more clearly and 
precisely in c. 4, as follows: in omnibus successionibus adgnatorum et 
cognatorum differentiam cessare… atque omnes sine ulla eiusmodi dif-
ferentia secundum cognationis suae gradum ad cognatorum ab intestato 
successiones vocare iubemus. The second principle, also a fundamental 
one, establishes complete equality of male and female persons in both 
the paternal and maternal lines with respect to succession law. Here, one 
should refer yet again to the general formulation in c. 4, which stipulates 
that: nullam autem differentiam esse volumus in ulla successione aut he-
reditate inter eos qui ad hereditatem vocantur masculos et feminas, quos 
communiter ad hereditatem vocari constituimus, sive per masculum sive 
per feminam defuncto coniungebantur. It may be added that the abro-
gation of differences between men and women in terms of succession 
was such an important and momentous principle to Justinian that he did 
not content himself with the just cited general formulation, but reiter-
ated how it applies in each of the four classes,17 into which he grouped 
the consecutive cognates appointed to the succession (c. 1, class I: neve 
ulla differentia inducatur utrum masculi an feminae sint; c. 2. classes 
16 In view of the now fading knowledge of Greek, I provide the text of the Novels in Latin.
17 The Novels mention only three classes in any case, combining classes II and III (in c.2).
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II and III: tam masculos quam feminas, neve ulla differentia inter eas 
personas observetur utrum masculi an feminae sint; c. 3. class IV: sive 
masculi sive feminae).
Of those four classes, the first encompasses descendants of all sexes 
without restriction as to the degree. The inheritance is divided among off-
spring of the same degree, essentially in capita. But there is no exclusion 
of the more remote by the more immediate one; next to sons and daugh-
ters, the issue of the deceased son or daughter is entitled to inheritance 
for instance; however, they jointly receive and subsequently divide be-
tween themselves only such portion of the estate that would have fallen 
to their parent, had they been alive (succession in stirpes). Should there 
be no inheritors of the first class, the second class succeeds. The latter 
comprises the ascendants and full siblings of the deceased. Among the 
ascendants, those of the nearest degree take precedence over those farther 
removed. Should there be individuals entitled on both the father’s and 
mother’s side, the inheritance is divided into two halves (in lineas), one 
of which goes to the paternal ascendants while the other to the mater-
nal ones, who then divide it among themselves as their number requires. 
This applies if there are only ascendants. Where there are surviving broth-
ers and sisters of the deceased, the estate is divided among the nearest 
ascendants and siblings in capita; also, under Nov. 127, the children of 
the deceased brother or sister are entitled to a share of inheritance after the 
deceased ancestor (in stirpes). Class III, the least numerous, includes step 
siblings of the deceased. The offspring of the deceased brother or sister, 
but not more distant descendants, inherit with the siblings, in stirpes of 
course. Finally, in class IV, all more remote collaterals are called to suc-
cession, without restriction as to the degree, but with the exclusion of the 
more distant degree in favour of the nearest of kin. 
The reason why I have recalled the foundations and the system of 
the Justinian succession so extensively and in such a textbook fashion is 
to make it easier to demonstrate how vastly it differs from ab intestato 
succession in the Correction when the two systems are compared. 
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Namely, with respect to the fundamental elements of the system, 
provisions of the Correction relating to the succession of collaterals still 
embrace the distinction between agnatic and cognatic kinship, which 
Justinian had abolished, though not in the sense of kinship based on 
paternal power, present or past, but in the sense of kinship in the male 
and female line, on the spear and distaff sides. Then, most importantly 
and in stark contrast to the absolute equality of men and women with 
respect to succession rights which Justinian had so forcefully empha-
sized, the Correction considerably disadvantages the female sex with 
respect to males. Even the first sentence of Title I, de successionibus, 
leaves no doubt in that matter. It reads as follows: In quaecunque bona, 
tam mobilia, quarn immobilia, si filii supersint, aequis sortibus filii 
tantum succedant: masculis deficientibus, filiae. Thus, if the decedent 
leaves sons, daughters are entirely excluded from succession, being 
solely entitled to a dower. If it had not been established or paid by the 
parents, this should be done within a year and six months by the broth-
ers inheriting after the deceased, with the assistance of two relatives 
in the paternal line and two in the maternal as well as two lay magis-
trates appointed by the land court (quae — sc. dos — nisi a parentibus 
assignata fuerit, per fratres et duos proximos ex parte patris, et duos 
ex parte matris, duosque Scabinos Terrestres illius districtus, in quo 
habitabunt, per ludicium Terrestre electos, intra annum et sex menses 
assignari et constitui debebit). In this case, the nature of things—as 
it is with every obligation resting on a person—may give rise to two 
possible outcomes. The brothers may fail to discharge the obligation in 
the designated period of time; then and only then can the sisters come 
into inheritance after the deceased parent (father or mother) on a par 
with their brothers (portiones suas una cum fratribus aequo iure in 
paternis, quam maternis bonis habebunt). Most often however, acting 
in their own interest, brothers will not neglect to establish a dower for 
the benefit of their sisters. Consequently, the daughters will have no 
rights to succession, not only after parents but also all ascendants in 
Critical Remarks on Roman Law… | 141 
general (Dote autem ita illis assignata, nullum ultra eam sibi ius hae-
reditarium, in bonis paternis vel maternis, aliorumve ascendentium … 
vendicare poterunt, licet nulla eo nomine renunciatio facta sit). What 
is more, where a succession after a deceased brother is concerned, 
dowried sisters will neither be entitled to claim increase of the endow-
ment, nor to succession after him, unless no brother of the decedent or 
none of their male offspring survive (nec ut dos ratione decedentium 
fratrum sibi augeatur o fratribus petere, sed illae sortes fratrum steri-
liter decedentium, ad fratres solos, aut fratrum masculini sexus libe-
ros, qui supervixerint, pleno iure devolventur). Only when all brothers 
of the deceased had died before him without issue can the sisters or 
possibly their children inherit after him (quod si fratres omnes steri-
liter décédant, sorores earumque liberi in stirpes in bonis succedent). 
Finally, women’s rights are also restricted in favour of other collater-
als, as they can succeed together with brothers only after sisters and 
female kin, but have no rights of succession after agnatic relatives 
(sororibus itidem amitis,18 materteris, avunculis, aliisque cognatis, 
non tamen patruis vel patruelibus aliisque agnatis una cum fratribus 
sorores earumque successor es in stirpes itidem succedent). This basic 
rule which handicaps women in the event of intestate succession is 
evinced in the Correction for all classes of successors, just as in Justin-
ian’s legislation the reverse principle of equality of both sexes applies 
to all classes of successors. 
Four such classes are distinguished in the Correction, just as had been 
done in Justinian’s law. The first—again, as in Justinian’s law—encom-
passes descendants of the first or more remote degrees, with an essential 
division of the estate in capita, whereas per stirpes mode is employed 
only when next to descendants of a certain degree there are children of 
one of those, who may succeed as their parent had predeceased the dece-
dent. However, unlike in Justinian’s regulations, class II does not com-
18 An evident mistake must have occurred in the statute, since amita, father’s sister, may be 
female, but is not a relative on the distaff side. 
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prise siblings and ascendants but siblings exclusively, again with a di-
vision per stirpes, where next to brothers or sisters succeeding by way 
of exception there are the inheriting children of the deceased brother or 
sister. Ascendants, in accordance with the sequence of degree, are in-
cluded only in class III. Given that the statute does not specifically pro-
vide in that respect, it should be surmised that in this case—in contrast 
to Justinian’s law—division in capita will invariably ensue. If the de-
cedent also left no ascendants, more distant collaterals—other than sib-
lings—become entitled to succession. The range of persons entitled to 
inheritance in this class IV is not restricted, just as Justinian would have 
it, but unlike in the Novels, near degree of kinship does not mean exclu-
sion of the more remote ones: next to relatives of a certain degree the 
issue of a relative of the same degree who had died earlier may inherit 
as well; naturally, division in stirpes would then apply. 
If one is willing to draw final conclusions from that comparison of 
the two systems, one will inevitably have to state that the purported 
influence of Justinian’s legislation on the Correction is hardly in evi-
dence. The fundamental principles governing the entire order of suc-
cession in both systems are diametrically different (the equal rights of 
men and women in Justinian, the disadvantaged position of women in 
the Correction; solely cognation in the Justinian Code, the distinction 
between agnation and cognation in the Correction). In the Correction, 
the composition of persons entitled to succession in classes II and III 
differs from what had been adopted in Justinian’s law. Also, the Correc-
tion approaches the range of entitled collaterals in a different manner 
(the possibility of division in stirpes) than Justinian’s regulation had 
done. It is only the division of inheriting persons into four classes which 
may be surmised to have been derived from the Novels and modelled on 
it, but was any model required there at all? After all, when one grants the 
right to succeed to the descendants, ascendants and collaterals, whilst dis-
tinguishing the siblings in the latter group—as the nature of things dic-
tates—the division into four classes is an inevitable outcome, is it not? 
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III
It is a prevailing notion in the scholarship that testaments were intro-
duced into the Polish legal system from Roman law through the inter-
mediary of the Church.19 There are no grounds to suspect that Royal 
Prussia was any different in this respect. If one adopts that explanation 
of the origin of last will dispositions, then it should also involve the prin-
ciple of their revocability until the death of the testators, a rule which, as 
I have already stated, is expressed in the Correction by means of a pure-
ly Roman, general formula. Given the unambiguous wording of the stat-
ute, one can hardly disagree that despite its origins, the content of the 
testament according to the Correction departs from the Roman norm, 
as it may only contain dispositions pertaining to chattels while clearly 
excluding immovable property (testamenta, autem de bonis mobilibus 
quibuscunque, non autem de immobilibus . . . condere liberum erit, Ti-
tle II, 2). The contention or, to put it more cautiously, doubt may arise 
only when one embarks on an examination of forms of last will dispo-
sitions. Namely, it has been said that in the Correction, the three ad-
missible forms of testator’s expression of their will correspond closely 
with the three forms of Justinian’s: testamentum tripertitum, apud acta 
conditum, principi oblatum. Let us then discuss them individually. Jus-
tinian refers (I. 2, 10, 3) to the a written private testament of his period 
as testamentum tripertitum, since in his opinion it constitutes an amal-
gamation of three elements: civil law, which required uno contextu the 
presence of witnesses summoned to the drafting of the will, imperial 
constitutions which prescribed that the testament be signed by the tes-
tator and the witnesses, and praetorian law, which stipulated that seals 
of the signatories need to be affixed to the testament and the number of 
necessary witnesses established for the document to be valid, of whom 
there should have been seven. A written testament in the Correction also 
19 See P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., vol. II, p. 67ff., S. Kutrzeba, Relazioni fra l’Italia e la Polo-
nia, Rome 1936, p. 71; from earlier authors, see P.J.W. Bandtkie, Prawo prywatne polskie, 
1851, p. 335.
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requires the signatures and seals of the testator and the witnesses, but 
the number of the latter is reduced to three (Title II, 33). If, therefore, 
one of the partes of that three-partite testament of Justinian’s is lacking 
in the Correction, then both testaments can hardly be deemed identical, 
and the testament in the Correction be qualified as a tripertitum. Other 
than that, the remaining components of that form of testament are per-
fectly obvious. Namely, it is natural that the testator and the witnesses 
have to sign the drafted will and, in accordance with the custom at the 
time, affix their seals. A model for such a straightforward form does not 
have to be sought elsewhere. 
The second form of testament defined in the Correction is a declara-
tion of will made before a court followed by its being entered into court 
records (si etiam in iure id testator facere maluerit, integrum illi erit, ad 
acta quaecunque authentica ultimam voluntatem suam disertis verbis 
profiteri atque in acta referendam curare, Title II, 3). It cannot be denied 
that it is thoroughly analogous to the Roman testament apud acta condi-
tum (C. 6, 23, 18; 19, 1, cf. D. 28, 4, 4). Still, having noted the analogy, 
it has to be remembered that the Middle Ages in Poland saw the wide-
spread practice of recording various uni- and bilateral legal acts—testa-
ments in particular—in court books. The custom existed both in land 
law and, to an even greater degree perhaps, in municipal law,20 while 
the Prussian nobility had for over a century (since 1476) been subject 
to the municipal law of Kulm. It is custom rather than Roman law which 
should be seen as the source of that form of testament. 
Finally, there is the third form, whereby the testator deposits their 
sealed testament—signed and with their seal affixed—with the court 
for safekeeping (testamentum sua solius manu subscriptum et sigillo ob-
signatum, clausum ad eadem acta offerre; cuius oblationis et traditionis 
actus, actis Officii inscribi debet, Title II, 3). Undoubtedly its equivalent 
20 See S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł dawnego prawa polskiego, vol. I, Lwów–Warszawa–
Kraków 1925, p. 53 ff., 140; for municipal books vol. II, p. 252 ff., regarding the testament 
specifically see P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 82, 407.
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is the Roman testament principi oblatum (C. 6, 23, pr. 1). Whether the 
former is genetically linked to the latter may be difficult to prove in my 
opinion, but to argue successfully to the contrary would be just as hard. 
IV
Roman law is also the alleged source of guardianship over women for 
which the Correction provides. At the same time, it is unclear wheth-
er the assertion was advanced with respect to the institution as such or 
its specific formulation. As for the first possibility, one should immedi-
ately counter it with a rebuttal, since lack of legal autonomy of women, 
that is their being hindered in legal life by virtue of subordination to 
a more or less extensive power of men is a phenomenon which emerged 
in numerous legal systems at some stage of development. Already Gai-
us, discussing Roman tutela mulierum, which he contrasted with the re-
lationships among the peregrini, could not deny that after all plerumque 
quasi in tutela sunt, ut ecce lex Bithynorum21, si quid mulier contra-
hat, maritum auctorem esse iubet aut filium eius puberem (Gai. I, 93). 
In Attic law, statutory tutelage over a woman is exercised by her κύριος: 
father, husband, alternatively brother or paternal grandfather, and it is 
widely assumed that a similar arrangement functioned in other legal 
systems of ancient Greece.22 Κύριος as a woman’s guardian also exists 
in the law of Greco-Roman Egypt, as may be reconstructed from Greek 
papyri.23 The fact of women being subject to custody can be determined 
in the law of the Sixth Dynasty (2625–2475 BCE). 24 The Old Germanic 
mundium over women may be mentioned as well, as an institution that 
is well known to historians of law.25 Those several examples, cited com-
21 A country in north-western Asia Minor.
22 P. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, Leipzig 1905–1915, p. 482 ff., 520, 
534 ff.; Taubenschlag, Vormundschaftsrechtliche Studien, 1915, p. 69 ff.
23 Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco — Roman Egypt, vol. l, p. 128ff. and Archives du Droit 
Oriental, vol. II, p. 293 ff.
24 Pirenne, Histoire des institutions et du droit privé de l’ancienne Egypte, vol. III, pp. 351–353.
25 R. Hübner, Grundzüge des deutschen Privatrechts, Leipzig 1930, p. 71 ff.
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pletely at random, suffice to warrant the conclusion that just as tute-
lage over women developed without the influence of Roman law in Old 
Egyptian, Attic, Bithynian or Germanic law, Polish law, including the 
Correction, did not need to rely on a foreign model to subject women to 
certain restrictions in legal life. 
It is therefore very likely that the purported influence of Roman law 
was identified in the specific framework of the tutelage of women es-
tablished in the Correction. Still, the view is also seriously dubious. 
In order to substantiate it, one should recall—in a general outline—
the pertinent norms of Roman law.26 When did a woman as such need 
a guardian in Rome? Only upon the end of puberty and attainment of 
autonomous legal status, sui iuris. She was not sui iuris as long as she 
stood under the power (potestas) of the father or grandfather or when 
in a cum manu marriage—while it remained valid—she became subject 
to her husband’s control (manus) in one of the ways which resulted in 
such a status. Thus, in no case could the power of the husband and that 
of a tutor (tutela) be simultaneously in effect with respect to one woman. 
Also, whilst remaining under continual tutelage for as long as it endured, 
a woman sui iuris could by no means be subject to curatorship (cura), 
even though there may have been reasons to establish such custody, such 
as being a spendthrift or suffering from a mental illness. Hence the pow-
er of the husband and the power of the guardian, the tutelage of the tu-
tor and the custody of the curator were mutually exclusive terms where 
women were concerned. One could be appointed for guardianship based 
on one of the consecutively considered titles: designation in the testa-
ment of the father or husband, agnatic kinship and, from a certain period 
onwards, appointment by authority. In the classical period, the guardian 
of a woman did not manage her property; the woman administered her 
estate on her own, and only some of the actions required the sanction 
(auctoritas) of the tutor (Gai. I, 190, Ulp. XI, 25, 27). Already at an 
early stage, the guardianship of agnates proved the sole viable option, 
26 Cf. Kozubski, Opieka nad kobietami w prawie rzymskim, Kraków 1922.
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as according to the account of Gaius (I, 192) they were the only ones 
who could not be compelled to grant auctoritatis. However, that type of 
tutelage is also the first to disappear. With respect to free-born women it 
was abolished as early as mid-first century by lex Claudia, which meant 
that henceforth they would only have guardians appointed under a testa-
ment or decree of the authorities. The significance of the latter modes of 
guardianship gradually diminished as well, disappearing ultimately in 
the Theodosian code27, not to mention Justinian’s codifications, where 
the excerpts from legal writings collected in the Digests were meticu-
lously purged of any mentions of them.
How does the above compare with the norms contained in the Cor-
rection (Title III, 20) which are alleged to have had Roman provenance? 
It sets forth that women are always subject to another’s power, but 
that power combines tutela and cura (mulieres in aliena tutela et cura 
semper sint). The statute further draws a distinction between unmarried 
women, referred to as filiae familias, and married ones. That peculiarly 
called authority over unmarried women is to be exercised by fathers, 
and upon their death by adult brothers; where there are no such broth-
ers, the power should be assumed by agnates, and in their absence by 
the nearest cognates (et filiae familias quidem in parentum aut fratrum, 
si adulti sint, tutorumve agnatorum, vel iis non existentibus cognato-
rum). However, the statute does not specify what the tutela and cura 
of an unmarried woman consists in, nor does it determine the scope of 
rights of the guardian. Only through argumento a contrario applied to 
the sentence discussed below can one infer that unmarried women were 
completely deprived of the right to dispose of their property, as the latter 
was entrusted solely to the person who held the custody of the woman. 
The position of married women is regulated even more perfunctorily. 
It is with only one single sentence that the statute grants women the ca-
pacity to dispose of their property with the consent of the husband and 
27 With the probable exception of Constantine’s constitution C. Th. 3, 17, 2, discussed by 
Taubenschlag, Vorm. Studien, p. 84.
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with the guardian in attendance (uxores cum maritorum consensu, tutore 
adhibito, liberam desponendi habeant facultatem). As for the question 
which immediately arises here, namely of whether the guardianship of 
married women involved the same persons who held it with respect to 
filiae familias—within the meaning of the Correction—the statute does 
not provide an answer. It merely follows that a married woman who 
personally disposes of her property must have two supervisors while 
doing so: the husband and the guardian. 
There is no need for a detailed recapitulation of that comparison 
between Roman norms and the norms in the Correction to warrant the 
conclusion that the latter differ utterly from the former. Although pro-
visions of the Correction do contain certain Roman notions and terms, 
they are curiously mixed and peculiarly employed. Filia familias is not 
a daughter remaining under her father’s authority, but an unmarried 
woman; the power of the father over his daughter is not potestas but 
tutela et cura; the same terms, mutually exclusive in Roman law, serve 
to define the rights of the guardian; relatives appointed to guardianship 
also include kin in the female line, the cognates; the validity of decisions 
relating to the property of a married woman require the consent of the 
husband and the participation of the guardian. Finally, the Correction 
refers to only one of the three types of guardianship distinguished by 
the mode of appointment, which was also the first to disappear in Rome. 
Thus one can hardly speak of the provisions of Roman law on guardian-
ship of women having been adopted in the Correction. 
At this point, another observation suggests itself. Today, direct in-
formation concerning the guardianship of women in Rome is derived 
chiefly from Gaius’ Institutes and the so-called Regulae of Ulpian’s. As 
is known, the Veronese manuscript of the Institutes was discovered in 
1816. Previously, one had only known the Visigothic synopsis of the 
Institutes, where guardianship of women is not mentioned at all. Ad-
mittedly, Ulpian’s Regulae were published in 1549 by du Tillet from 
a manuscript which went missing and was later rediscovered only by 
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Savigny.28 It was used by Cuajcius, Heidenstein’s contemporary (1522–
1590), who took advantage of it as a source in his disquisition concern-
ing the guardianship of women.29 On the other hand, Cujacius’s frequent 
adversary—Donellus (1527–1591), who paid less attention to the his-
torical development of Roman law to focus on its systematics instead, 
never mentioned that guardianship in his writings. And Heidenstein was 
not Cujacius, after all. With all due respect for his studies in Padua, 
one cannot overlook the fact that the knowledge of private Roman law 
among average students of Bologna or Padua was based primarily on 
Justinian’s collections which provided a basis for the scholarly work 
of glossators and, often indirectly through glosses, commentators as 
well. Also, we must not forget that the time when the Correction was 
drafted was the heyday of humanism, when the speeches and writings 
of Cicero and Livy’s History were part of the usual reading of an edu-
cated person. It has to be admitted that even before the discovery of 
Gaius and the possibility of perusing Ulpian’s Regulae one had been 
able to read—in general terms—about the legal dependence of women 
and their being subject to guardianship both in Cicero (pro Murena 27: 
mulieris omnis propter infirmitatem consilii maiores in tutoris potes-
tate esse voluerunt),30 and in Livy (in Cato’s speech of 195 in defence 
of legis Oppiae: maiores nostri nullam ne privatavi quidem rem agere 
feminas sine tutore auctore voluerunt, in manu esse parentium, fratrum, 
vivorum, 34, 2).31 Without doubt, it was Cicero that the contemporaries 
28 P.F. Girard, F. Senn, Textes de droit romain, 1937, p. 401 f.
29 See e.g. in the Neapolitan edition from 1722 Observationum et emendationum, liber 
VII, cap. XI (vol. III, col. 172/3), liber XXII, cap. XX (vol. III, col. 648); In libros 9 respon-
sorum Julii Pauli, vol. VI, col. 555/6.
30 The tutelage of women, auctoritas tutoris in particular, is mentioned by Cicero in sev-
eral other speeches; pro Caecina 25, 72: quod mulier sine tutore auctore promiserit, teneri 
(ironically, referring to the legally impossible state of fact); pro Fiacco 34, 84: nihil enim 
potest de tutela légitima nisi omnium tutorum auctoritate deminui; 35, 86: quaecunque sine 
hoc auctore est dicta dos, nulla est; as well as in one of the letters to Atticus: id mirabamur 
te ignorare de tutela légitima in qua dicitur esse puella, nihil usu capi posse, Ad Att. 1, 5, 6.
31 Livy’s story about Hispala Fecenia is in fact an indirect reference to the tutelage of women; 
the Senate granted her the right to choose her guardian (tutoris optio) in reward for her help 
in exposing the Bacchanalian Conspiracy. 
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relied on when developing their Latin style; it was from him that they 
learned eloquence and gained knowledge of the systemic instruments 
of Rome, but in the work of codification, when one sought to formulate 
legal norms whilst availing themselves of the Roman model, they would 
certainly not have looked for it in the monumental pieces of antique 
rhetoric or history, but in the body of Roman law which was expressed 
in Justinian’s codification. The latter, however, says nothing about the 
guardianship of women. 
V
With respect to the tutelage of minors, the influence of Roman law was 
detected in a whole range of elements. These include grounds for ap-
pointment to guardianship, the need of permission for the alienation 
of property of the ward, the distinction between tutores gerentes and 
honorarii, accusatio suspecti tutoris, statutory lien on the estate of the 
guardian in respect of claims of the former ward arising from the ex-
ercise of guardianship, and finally the liability of the guardian for do-
lus and culpa lata. On top of those, one should also add the inventory 
made by the guardian, which for incomprehensible reasons is not listed 
in Prof. Taubenschlag’s treatise, although it may have offered a major, 
albeit only ostensible argument in support of the reception of Roman 
law into the Correction. 
Before the respective provisions of the Correction are compared 
with the pertinent norms of Roman guardianship law, it must be stat-
ed that here the author demonstrates an erudition in Roman law which 
surpasses any other section in the Correction. It is here that we find the 
aforecited (p. 1), purely Roman description of the scope of the ward’s 
own capacity for action (title III,18), as well as the rationale for the 
guardian’s liability for culpa, which arises from the fact that it consti-
tutes dolo proxima. Besides, the title de tutelis (III) is replete with Ro-
man designations and terms in any case. However, given the results of 
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our analysis so far, it would be legitimate to ask whether those expres-
sions and terminology are not merely a facade, but indeed harbour and 
must harbour equally Roman substance. 
The question arises immediately with the first issue: the appoint-
ment of the guardian. Just as Roman law had done, the Correction dis-
cerns a hierarchy of three grounds for appointment and describes them 
using Roman terms: tutores testamentarii, legitimi and dati (Title III, 6). 
But even the first does not quite correspond to the actual state of af-
fairs. While in Rome testamentary guardianship was indeed founded on 
the will of the potestate expressed in the testament, the Correction per-
mits omnibus liberos impuberes habentibus to appoint guardians for mi-
nors, but they may do so either by means of testament or a request reg-
istered with a court (Title III, 1).32 Thus, despite the Roman name used 
in the Correction, the second type of tutelage will not be a testamentary 
one, although it will be based on the will of the potestate. The second 
category of guardians, appointed where there are no tutors appointed by 
the potestate, are the so-called statutory guardians or consanguineous 
guardians, as they are referred to in Polish law.33 In Rome, agnates used 
to become such guardians for a number of centuries, and it was only 
Justinian who, having based statutory succession exclusively on cogna-
tion, extended his reform to include guardianship as well, and enacted 
appointment of cognatic relatives (Nov. 118 c.5). In Rome, therefore, 
cognates historically succeeded agnates in terms of eligibility for ap-
pointment. The Correction approaches the matter differently, with a dis-
tinct sequence of appointment where cognates follow agnates, as tutores 
legitimi are in the first place proximi agnati, qui nimirum masculino sexu 
wardlis coniuncti sunt, and in the absence of those proximi cognati, qui 
per feminam wardlos cognatione attingunt (Title III, 2). Again—a Ro-
man name, but not strictly Roman substance. If a minor had no relatives 
32 The matter is therefore regulated in the same way as in Polish Crown law, see P. Dąbkowski, 
op.cit., vol. I, p. 490.
33 P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., vol. I, p. 493.
152 | Zygmunt Lisowski
in the male and female line, or if such relatives refused guardianship for 
statutory reasons (si legitimis causis a tutela se excusent), the land court 
would, at anyone’s solicitation (a quocunque eo nomine appellatum), 
appoint two or three appropriate guardians (idoneos et sufficienter ibi-
dem possessionatos, Title III, 4). Concerning the successive bodies of 
authority which were tasked with appointing guardians in Roman law, 
see I. 1, 20. 
Drafting the inventory of the ward’s estate as a basis for account-
ing for the custody after it ceased is a fundamental duty of the guard-
ian, in Roman law and in the Correction alike, and the concurrence of 
pertinent norms in both legal systems is exceptionally substantial. Ac-
cording to the Correction, it is the first action of each guardian (sive 
testamentarii fuerint, sive legitimi, sive dati), which they should under-
take within a month from assuming guardianship (tutelae suae adminis-
trationem a confectione inventarii ordiantur, Title III, 6). In Justinian’s 
law, prior to making the inventory the guardian may only engage in 
actions of the most urgent concern (nihil itaque gerere ante inventarium 
factum eum oportet, nisi id quod dilationem nec modicam exspectare 
possit D. 27, 7, 7 pr. i. f. and C. 5, 51, 13). Pursuant to the imperial 
rescript, the inventory must be made with a representative of the au-
thority in attendance (sub praesentia publicarum personarum, C. 5, 37, 
24 pr.), whereas the Correction sets forth that at the request of guardians, 
competent land judge will dispatch two lay magistrates to the estate of 
the ward, who, having made the inventory, will sign it and affix their 
seals (Iudex Terrestris loci illius a tutoribus requisitus, duos Scabinos 
in bona wardlorum delegabit, qui confectum inventarium manibus suis 
subscribant, et sigillis muniant). In the Correction, failure to discharge 
the obligation on the part of the guardian will entail dire consequences, 
because when their custody expires, they may be liable to recompense 
loss to the amount which will be determined, within the limits decreed 
by the court, by the oath of former wards or their inheritors (quod si a tu-
toribus prometer mis sum, fuerit, quanti a wardlis aut haeredibus eo-
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rum, moderatione iudicis praecedente, in litem iurabitur, tantum damni 
nomine praestare illis tenebuntur). The rule in Roman law is no differ-
ent: the guardian who deliberately (dolo) fails to make the inventory: in 
ea conditione est, ut teneatur in id quod wardli interest, quod ex iureiu-
rando in litem aestimabitur (D. cit.). On the judge’s determination of the 
maximum amount to which one may swear, see D. 12, 3, 5, 1. 
Furthermore, the Correction echoes Roman law in its restriction of 
the guardian’s powers to dispose of the ward’s estate. Nonetheless, they 
agree only as to the principle of limitation, whose core idea—to main-
tain the most important components of the estate intact for the benefit 
of the ward—is so natural that it is also found in Kulm law (c. 166) 
and in Polish Crown law.34 Also, there are substantial differences be-
tween the systems as far as the scope of restrictions is concerned. In Ro-
man law, the first limitation was introduced by the resolution of the Sen-
ate of 195, passed on the initiative of Septimius Severus (Oratio Severi 
D. 27, 9, 1 pr. — § 2). It was concerned only with rural and suburban land 
(praedia rustica et suburbana) and permitted the guardian to alienate it 
only in two cases: 1. necessarily, when sale was directed in a testament 
or codicil; 2. when approved by competent authority (praetor or prov-
ince governor), if sale or hypothecation proved necessary to satisfy the 
debts which could not be paid from other portions of the ward’s estate. 
Constantine went much farther in the constitution of 326 (C. 5, 37, 22), 
where the prohibition was extended to include all major component of 
the ward’s estate, such as urban property and more valuable chattels (au-
rum, argentum, gemmas, vestes, ceteraque mobilia praetiosa, urbana 
etiam mancipia), making an exception for used pieces of attire and su-
perfluous animals (§§ 6, 7). Disposal which violated this prohibition, i.e. 
occurred without the consent of authority, was invalid (venditio tutoris 
nulla sit sine interpositione decreti, § 6). The Correction approaches the 
issue differently. The limitation imposed on the guardians in Section 9, 
Title III, pertains only to immovable property, while the exception as-
34 See P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., vol. I, p. 508 f.
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sociated with the request of the father, provided for in Oratio Severi, 
is not taken into account at all. Alienation or a pledge always require 
authorization from the land court, which is granted provided that admis-
sible grounds are stated (immobilia bona non nisi ex sequentibus causis, 
et decreto Iudicii Terrestris causa aliqua earum in ludido Terrestri prius 
probata). These reasons, exhaustively enumerated, include: 1) payment 
of dowry (dotis solvendae); 2) upkeep of the ward, if there are no other 
means to cover it (alimentorum wardlis, si aliter ea expediri non pos-
sunt, constituendorum); 3) avoidance of losses which may arise from 
failure to satisfy a lien or pay usurious interest rates (damna ex obliga-
tionibus aliquibus, aut usuris, si ea non explicarentur, provenientia); and 
4) payment of liquid debts (liquidorum debitorum solutio). If alienation 
took place without such reasons in evidence and without a court decree, 
it would be invalid as in Roman law, and the ward would not lose their 
property (dominium non transferetur, recteque postea a wardlis vindi-
cari poterunt).
If one guardian seems to have been a rule in Roman law, though 
undoubtedly there may have been several as well, the Correction gives 
preference to multiple guardians, both statutory and those appointed 
by court. Thus, if there is a greater number of relatives in one degree 
who solicit guardianship, the court tres ex ipsis, si tot sint, deligat (Ti-
tle II, 3), and where there are no relatives, the court is to appoint the 
guardian tutores duos aut tres dare tenebitur (Title II, 4). Naturally, the 
father was also entitled to appoint more numerous guardians. Neverthe-
less, in such cases the paucity of the ward’s estate or the purposefulness 
of its administration may have required that it be placed in the hands 
of one, or possibly a couple of guardians. The others, whom the Cor-
rection does not name as tutores honorarii as it had been observed in 
such circumstances in Rome (see e.g. D. 26, 7, 3, 2; 23, 2, 62), will be 
obliged to supervise that guardians adequately discharge their custodial 
duties since, as in Roman law, those inactive guardians will be jointly 
responsible for the care over a ward or its inheritors (wardlis tarnen hae-
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redibusve eorum omnes coniunctim . . . in solidum, Title III, 10). Also, it 
does not follow from the text of the statute whether the liability should 
only be a subsidiary one, as under D. 26, 7, 3, 2 (excussis prius faculta-
tibus eius qui gesserit conveniri oportere).35 Meanwhile, reimbursement 
of losses incurred as a result of poor administration on the part of the 
guardian or guardians may be sought by the ward or their inheritors 
after guardianship expires, through an action analogous to the Roman 
actio tutelae, with a period of limitation of three years and three months 
(Title III, 19). However, that is as far as the analogy goes. In spite of 
what has been claimed, the extent of liability of the guardian differs be-
tween the Correction and Justinian’s law. According to the Correction, 
the guardian is liable for malevolent intent and gross negligence (nihil 
praeter dolum et culpam latam, quae dolo próxima est, tutor praestare 
debet, Title III, 17), while Justinian’s law obliges them to exercise the 
same due diligence in the affairs of their ward as they would in their own 
(so-called culpa levis in concreto D. 27, 3, 1 pr). The analogy returns in 
the provisions related to securing claims of the ward against the guard-
ian in respect of the tutelage. As in Roman law following Constantine’s 
constitution of 314 (C. 5, 37, 20), the pupil is entitled in the Correction 
to a general pledge on the entire estate of the former guardian (et ipsi et 
bona eorum in solidum obligata erunt, Title III, 10).36
This is how matters will stand once the tutelage ceases, but still 
while it lasts it may turn out that the guardian is not up to the task; in 
such a case they may be removed from the guardianship (decreto ludi-
cii a tutela removeatur, Title III, 11). This remotio tutoris does indeed 
resemble the analogous Roman institution that usually ensued the so-
called accusatio suspecti tutoris.37 The latter originates from the Twelve 
Tables, but it seems to have been limited at the time to testamentary tu-
35 The responsibility of guardians who are not involved in administration is also a subsidiary 
one in the Kulm law, cap. 172. 
36 A lien of that kind had already existed in the Kulm law, cap. 171.
37 Regarding this procedure see R. Taubenschlag, Vormundschaftsrechtliche Studien, Leipzig 
1915, p. 30 ff.
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tors and guardians appointed by the authority, while under Justinian’s law 
it could be applied to all guardians (D. 26, 10, 15 = I. 1, 26, 2). A guardian 
could be denounced before a praetor or province governor (I, 1, 26, 1) 
or—in the Correction—before a land court by anyone, for as Ulpian states 
in D. h. t. 1, 6, sciendum est quasi publicam esse hanc actionem, hoc 
est omnibus patere. Similarly, the Correction sanctioned summoning (vo-
care) of the guardian by anyone, close persons and strangers alike, if they 
were concerned about the care over the ward (vel propinquo, vel etiam ali-
eno, qui cura pupilli tangatur, Title III, 11). The grounds for removal also 
appear to be similar, but there is a significant and, from the standpoint of 
our deliberations, characteristic difference. In Roman law, tutor suspectus 
is a general notion38 (genus) which may encompass various states of fact 
(species). Therefore, considering the casuistic nature of Roman jurispru-
dence, jurists elaborate on the causes which could justify finding a guard-
ian suspectus and lead to their removal from guardianship. Consequently, 
a suspected guardian is wasteful with the ward’s estate, administers it neg-
ligently or to the detriment of the ward (si forte grassatus in tutela est aut 
sordide agit vel perniciose pupillo, D. 26, 10, 3, 5); furthermore, they have 
misappropriated something belonging to the estate (aliquid intercepit ex 
rebus pupilaribus, ib.); failed to provide means for the upkeep of the ward 
(qui ad alimenta praestanda copiam sui non faciat, D. h. t. 3, 14); or have 
disposed of things whose disposal is prohibited without a decree of a com-
petent authority (qui res vetitas sine decreto distraxerit, D. h. t. 3, 13) etc. 
Among those examples, many more of which could be cited from the Di-
gests, the first one is the most important for us. It suggests that to the Ro-
mans, careless administration of the ward’s estate was only one of the 
possible manifestations of the suspected character of the guardian. Things 
are altogether different in the Correction, as suspected character of the 
guardian and their poor administration are deemed equal notions there. 
The statute specifies two causes which sanction calling the guardian to ac-
count: the suspected character of the guardian and their deficient manage-
38 This follows both from Gai. I, 182 and above all from I. 1, 26, pr. § 1.
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ment (si tutor tutoresve suspecti sint vel bona pupilli male administrent, 
Title III, 11). Moreover, this is not random, imprecise wording which oc-
curs only once, because again the Correction states two causes which may 
justify the decree to remove the guardian: if the guardian is suspected in 
the light of the revenue account or certain other circumstantial evidence, 
or if it turns out that they have administered the estate poorly (si ex ra-
tionibus proventuum vel certis aliis indiciis suspectus juerit, aut tutelam 
male administrare reperietur). One may well ask whether those are in-
deed two causes for removal. After all, if the first cause is reflected in the 
revenue account, this means that the books demonstrate poor administra-
tion. The first cause is identical with the second, while the whole notion of 
suspecti tutoris is left hanging in the air. What does this prove? It proves 
that the author of the Correction remembered that under Roman law it had 
been possible to remove the guardian as suspectus, but failed to appreci-
ate the crucial, generic significance of the notion and did not realize that 
he merely introduced the Roman term into the statute and used it to denote 
content he expressed in other words. 
This is how the Correction stands with respect to Roman law in 
the domain of guardianship over minors, the part of the statute which 
echoes Roman law the most. In the above analysis of particular institu-
tions, I have deliberately cited source texts quite extensively, so that 
an impartial reader may determine for themselves where the truth lies. 
Still, in that detailed disquisition the essential threads of the issue might 
have been lost. Therefore, though not wanting to incur the accusation 
of repeating myself needlessly, I may perhaps be allowed to go over 
the similarities and differences between the examined systems once 
again, to conclude that here as well as in other sections of the Correc-
tion certain Roman notions and terms do occur, but either they do not 
appear in the pure Roman form, or do not bear significantly on the insti-
tutions to which they were applied. Thus—successively recapitulating 
particular issues—the will of the father may appoint a guardian for his 
children, but it may be conveyed not only in a testament, as in Rome, 
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but also in a request registered with a court. Statutorily, relatives are 
appointed to tutelage, but unlike in Justinian’s Novels, a distinction is 
made between kin in the male and female line, whereby the former takes 
precedence. Guardians are restricted in their disposal of the estate of 
their ward, but the objective scope of the limitations and the reasons 
for which alienation or encumbrance are admissible differ from what 
is set forth in Roman law. The guardian may be removed from their 
position either because they administer the estate of their ward poorly, 
or because they are suspectus, whereas in Roman law the notion of tu-
toris suspecti is a genus which may manifest in various actions of the 
guardian, including negligent administration. Guardians who are not in-
volved in the management are equally liable to the ward or their inheri-
tors in equal measure as the administrators but, in contrast to Roman 
law, their responsibility is not a subsidiary one. The two systems adopt 
a different me sure of diligence whose inadequate exercise will incur 
liability on the part of the guardian. It is only with respect to the obliga-
tion and manner of making the inventory and consequences of failure 
to discharge it, the essential possibility of removing the guardian while 
the guardianship lasts and the securing of claims to which the ward is 
entitled in respect of the guardianship through general pledge on the 
estate of the guardian that Roman law and the Correction show signifi-
cant correspondences. But here, perhaps with the exception of the latter 
point, actual reception cannot be easily argued, if reception is taken to 
mean the adoption of an institution from a foreign legal system with its 
foundations and specific form. Because even obliging the guardian to 
inventory the estate whose administration they assume with a view to 
handing it over later to the estate’s proper owner seems so natural that 
the introduction of the obligation into the statute did not require draw-
ing on the Roman model.39 Relating to this subject, iusiurandum in litem 
is undoubtedly a purely Roman term, but it should be remembered that 
39 The obligation exists in the Kulm law (cap. 167) and in Crown land law, see P. Dąbkowski, 
op.cit., vol. I, p. 502 f.
Critical Remarks on Roman Law… | 159 
the oath of a party was a standard mode of demonstrating the extent of 
loss in a Crown lawsuit as well40, and it is thence that it could have been 
adopted into the Correction. The removal of a guardian while they still 
hold guardianship is not much different. After all, the guardianship can 
sometimes last very long, as according to the Correction one comes of 
age at 18 (Title III, 13). The guardian may prove to be an inept or a dis-
honest administrator. It is true that after guardianship ceases they will 
be held accountable for all their misdeeds to the ward or their inheri-
tors, but would it not be more reasonable to have them removed from 
administration immediately when their ineptness or dishonesty have 
been determined? Did one really need to look to Roman law for such 
a straightforward concept? Post hoc does not always have to be propter 
hoc. Obviously, this observation does not preclude that certain details 
in what is most likely a naturally developed institution41 may have been 
based on the Roman model (e.g. the catalogue of persons entitled to re-
port their suspicion and the resulting “popular” aspect of the procedure). 
VI
In the area of substantive law, it has been claimed that Roman law has 
influenced the institution of usucaption, in particular the inadmissibility 
of usucaption on property acquired vi et clam. I admit that I find the as-
sertion made with regard to the latter incomprehensible. The grounds for 
acquisitive prescription in Justinian’s law are conveyed in the following, 
well-known medieval hexameter: res habilis, titulus, fides, possessio, 
tempus. In the Correction, prescriptive acquisition of ownership to im-
movables (because this is not the only element at stake here) will ensue 
if someone per triginta annos non vi, non clam, non alieno sed suo no-
mine, et titulo bonaque fide, pacifice sine ulla uiusquam interpellatione 
40 See O.M. Balzer, op.cit., p. 157 f.
41 It should be recalled yet again that the removal of the guardian qui malo more gessit is 
provided for in the Kulm law (cap. 162) and in Crown law, see P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., vol. I, 
p. 520 ff.
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possederit (Title IV). Let us leave aside the stipulation of the Correction 
that the usucaptor must possess the thing in their own name, otherwise 
they would be no proprietor, as well as the condition that the possession 
cannot be interrupted (interpellatio), because obviously if a hiatus in 
usucaption takes place, then according to general rules the entire past 
period of possession is void, meaning that only new usucaption can be-
gin where suitable circumstance occur. If, however, we omit those two 
elements and compare the catalogue of conditions in the hexameter and 
the Correction, then we will be compelled to state that the statute sets 
forth too many or too few. There are too many in the sense that if the 
proprietor is to have a title, i.e. such a legal event which usually, were 
it not for the absence of rights of the predecessor, would lead them to 
acquisition of ownership, then obviously he could not have acquired the 
things either vi or clam. Conversely, there are too few in the sense that 
the catalogue of the Correction does not mention the condition listed 
in the first place in the hexameter, in other words it does not require 
that the thing be suitable for usucaption, a res habilis. However, per-
haps the omission is only apparent, a conjecture one can arrive at by 
way of the following reasoning. Res habilis in Roman law has not been 
stolen or taken by violence, because if it is encumbered with such a vi-
tum, then not only the thief or the violent individual but also no one 
else—up to a certain moment (so-called reversio ad dominum)—will be 
able to acquire its ownership by prescription (I. 2, 6, 2, ff.). Theft after 
all is perpetrated clandestinely (clam) or using violence (vi). The same 
applies to unlawful takeover of somebody else’s land. Therefore, by in-
troducing the requirement that the usucapted thing be acquired non vi 
non clam, the author of the Correction may have wanted to exclude 
things acquired by violence or clandestinely from usucaption. However, 
he did not realize that by formulating the condition using words cited 
above he changed the objective qualification of the usucapted property 
into the subjective qualification of the owner. He would have done bet-
ter to have adhered to the Kulm law he sought to correct, which in the 
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edition of 1580 concurs with Roman law by laying down the principle 
that a thing furto vel rapina oblata… furto vel rapinae ma neat obnoxia, 
quantumvis diu possederit (cap. 109) and such a thing, though it may 
have been acquired in good faith, cannot be subject to usucaption. 
If we approach the Correction by making allowances based on the 
above reasoning, then it has to be admitted that conditions of usucaption 
in that statute are indeed copied from Roman law. Such an assortment 
cannot be found in the Kulm compilation of 1580, which for usucap-
tion to take place requires only bona fide sine contradictione iudiciali 
(cap. 108) nor in Polish Crown law which, setting out from the so-called 
prescriptive loss of right, did not in consequence require either title or 
good faith for the acquisition of ownership.42
However, the influence of Roman law on the conditions of usucap-
tion we have determined here does not include the period of time it 
requires to ensue. The periods of ordinary prescription in the Correction 
are different than in Justinian’s law. Unlike the latter, which requires 
3 years for movable property, 10 or 20 (depending on whether usucap-
tion occurs inter praesentes or absentes) for immovables (C. 7, 31, un.), 
the Correction posits 3 years and 3 days for chattels, and 30 years for 
realty, as in Justinian’s extraordinary usucaption with good faith but 
without a title (C. 7, 39. 8, 1). 
We have thus reached the end of our deliberations. Their findings 
may be summarized in several sentences. The Correction cannot dem-
onstrate the influence of Roman law on provisions relating to estate in-
ventory and passive locus standi in an action for succession, because 
the Correction is not concerned with either of those institutions. There 
is no trace of influence of Roman law on succession ab intestato, which 
in the Correction is founded on principles which are contradictory to 
Justinian’s legislation, or on the guardianship of women, which despite 
using Roman terms in respective provisions is utterly at odds with its 
Roman counterpart. No indication of influence can be found in the ex-
42 P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., vol. I, p. 298 ff.
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tent of liability of the guardian, which the Correction determines differ-
ently than Justinian’s law. It is unlikely that Roman law had influenced 
restrictions of the powers of the guardian by prohibiting alienation of 
certain components of the ward’s estate, in view of the natural basis 
of the institution and the scope of limitations adopted in the Correction, 
which differs from the Roman regulations. However, the influence of 
that law is probable in the case of the origins of testament and the set 
of conditions posited for usucaption of immovables. Also, some influ-
ence may have possibly been exerted on the procedural details relating 
to the guardian’s inventory of estate and removal from guardianship, 
although both institutions are likely to have been based on domestic 
solutions. Perhaps the influence is also reflected in the provisions on 
securing claims of the ward against the guardian by means of general 
pledge on the estate of the latter, and the form of the testament depos-
ited with the court for safekeeping. With the exception of the origin 
of testament and the conditions for usucaption, these are all matters of 
secondary importance and even if one conclusively proved that the pro-
visions in question do draw on Roman law, its broader reception into 
the Correction could hardly be acknowledged as true. It might have 
been suggested by the Roman formulations of certain legal rules which 
the author had included in the statute and the Roman terms he had em-
ployed. But the terms—as I have attempted to demonstrate—were often 
not used in their erstwhile Roman sense (filia familias, tutela et cura), 
and at times the author failed to comprehend their actual meaning (tutor 
suspectus). They only prove that the creator of the statute had become 
acquainted with Roman law and remembered some of it, but they do 
not warrant the conclusion that the author sought to introduce Roman 
institutions into the statute he had conceived. Instead of reception, it 
would probably be more accurate to speak of reminiscences of Roman 
law in the Correction. The use of Roman terminology was in any case 
also due to the fact that the author drafted the Correction in Latin, there-
fore he was compelled to refer to Roman legal nomenclature order to 
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describe domestic institutions. As for the substance of the provisions, 
that external linguistic form cannot be any indication. 
While I define the relationships between Roman law and the Cor-
rection in the above manner I still have to admit that Royal Prussia—
except for the areas where the Second and Third Statutes of Lithuania 
were in force43—was the part of the Polish state whose land law of-
fered the most discernible threads linking that legal system, if only in 
terminology, with Justinian’s great achievement. In the land law of the 
Crown, the connections with Roman law were always fairly loose and 
expired with the Statute of Warka of 1423. It is true that when in the ear-
ly sixteenth century a need for codification emerged to address the un-
certainty and particularity of domestic law, the inclinations to take the 
principles of Roman law into account were by no means meagre. Some 
went as far as Śliwnicki who, having been called upon to codify munici-
pal law wanted to Romanize it completely (around 1524), and to endow 
the transformed municipal law with an ancillary function to land law.44 
However, his draft did not become a statute. Also, no later codification 
relied on the work by Przyłuski (1553), who did not have so far-reaching 
designs as Śliwnicki, but wished that Roman law may at least serve to 
explain and systematize land law.45 Little or no heed was given to Roy-
sius, who counselled supplementing the rules of domestic law with the 
more refined Roman norms.46 The appeals were in vain due to essential 
reluctance towards any foreign law on the part of the nobility, whose 
champion in that matter was such an emblematic representative of that 
estate as Orzechowski.47 Besides, attempts at the codification of sub-
43 Cf. R. Taubenschlag, Wpływy rzymsko-bizantyńskie w II Statucie litewskim, Lwów 1953; 
and La Storia della recezione…, op.cit., p. 239 f.
44 P. Kutrzeba, op.cit., vol. II, s. 266 ff.; P. Estreicher, Polska kultura prawnicza XVI wieku, in: 
Kultura staropolska, 1933, p. 57. It may be noted that Śliwnicki made unsuccessful efforts 
to convince the Prussian council to his draft at the congress held in Grudziądz, in October 
1524, see article by J. Dworzaczkowa in this journal, vol. VI, 1 p. 178 ff.
45 P. Kutrzeba, op.cit., vol. I, p. 252 ff.; P. Estreicher, op.cit., pp. 57–58.
46 P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., vol. I, p. 25.
47 P. Estreicher, op.cit., p. 58 f.
164 | Zygmunt Lisowski
stantive law, both those undertaken in the seventeenth century as well as 
later, in the eighteenth century, were ineffectual48 and Crown land law 
remained legislation based on medieval foundations until the end of the 
Commonwealth.49
In contrast, what Śliwnicki wanted to achieve through legislative 
process happened of itself, in a sense, in Prussia. As I have previous-
ly emphasized, the Correction was a partial codification. It regulated 
substantive law to a minor extent, and left out obligations completely. 
In those domains, the nobility had to rely on the applicable Kulm law 
which, as an offshoot of the Magdeburg law, did avail itself of the norms 
of Roman law when it had to be supplemented, just as its parent body of 
laws had done. This did not provoke opposition from the Prussian nobil-
ity who, being more involved in trade than in other provinces, under-
stood that for the sake of their own interest it is better to have those re-
lationships governed by international Roman law rather than particular 
domestic law. 
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